Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.
Hungary has had a remarkably high public debt throughout the transition, and it has continued to increase during recent years, exceeding 80% of the GDP. Its debt and fiscal deficit were the highest among the Visegrád countries during the transition. One factor triggering the debt increase may be elections-related fiscal policies. By analyzing quarterly data for Hungary, we found clear empirical evidence of fiscal expansion before elections and contractions afterwards. These events are widely known as political fiscal cycles. We observed statistically significant incremental increases in fiscal deficits as elections approach, both in nominal and in GDP ratios, followed by contractions after elections. Thus, it can be concluded that incumbents in Hungary are engaged in opportunistic political fiscal cycles by embracing expansionary fiscal policy before parliamentary elections. Our findings also suggest that political fiscal cycles in Hungary may be an underlying factor contributing to the accumulation of public debt.
Introduction
According to the opportunistic political business cycles (PBC) theory that was originally developed by Nordhaus (1975) , the incumbent engages in expansionary economic policies and behaves in an opportunistic manner before an election to increase the likelihood of winning. The Nordhaus political business cycle theory asserts that governments stimulate economic growth before elections, thus benefiting from the short-run Philips curve and price rigidities in the short term. Inflation increases after an election because of the preelection economic expansion. After elections, incum-bents revert to tight economic policies to stabilize or reduce inflation.
An alternative view is the partisan PBC theory, which substantially differs from the opportunistic PBC theory because the former is based upon an ideological approach rather than on an opportunistic approach focused only on the incumbent's re-election.
Hibbs (1977) Meanwhile, Shi and Svensson (2006) identify the aspect of information asymmetry among voters and the incumbents' rents of staying in power to be relevant factors in explaining political budget cycles.
The framework of an opportunistic PBC is considered relevant not only for developing/transition countries but also for developed countries -the opportunistic cycle theory regarding government spending inclinations has been observed in Germany (Galli & Rossi, 2002) , and with respect to lower fiscal balance, it has been observed in several OECD developed countries with weaker fiscal transparency (Alt &Lassen, 2006) .
Hungary has had remarkably high debt throughout the transition, and it had the largest fiscal deficit during the transition of all Visegrád group countries.
The Hungarian debt has continued to increase during the last several years, exceeding 80% of the GDP and prompting the European Union to suspend funds of 495 m euros ($655 m; £417 m) due to the country's budget deficit. This is the first case of the EU taking action over the budget deficit of any of its members (BBC, 2012) . Despite the recent attempt by the government to curb public spending, debt is still high and remains a major concern for the Hungarian economy.
Furthermore, there are concerns that the government may follow expansionary economic policies prior to the 2014 elections (Than & Szakacs, 2012) , which may trigger increasing of debt. The Hungarian political system provides a basis for a strong government that can more easily persuade fiscal expansionary policies. The Hungarian parliament is unicameral, meaning it does not have an upper chamber. Furthermore, the President does not have veto power over legislative proposals. Therefore, as long as the government holds the majority in the parliament, it can easily pursue its fiscal policies (Haggard, Kaufman, & Shugart, 2001) . In the last two elections, the winning party received the necessary majority in the parliament to establish a government with its own votes; thus, there was no need for a coalition, a situation that may be favorable political ground for conducting PFC (see Streb, Lema, & Torrens, 2009 ).
The lack of strict and practically enforced fiscal rules in Hungary may have also been a supporting factor for PFC, as was the case for a panel of American states according to Rose (2005) .
The objective of our work is to identify the possible existence of political fiscal (or budget) cycles (PFC) in Hungary based on an opportunistic PBC framework.
Given Hungary's political and economic history, its institutional organization, its macroeconomic developments during the last two decades of democracy and its Vizja Press&IT www.ce.vizja.pl Searching for Political Fiscal Cycles in Hungary market economy, we hypothesize that and empirically test whether incumbents' behavior in Hungary toward fiscal policy is considerably similar to the implications of an opportunistic PBC framework. The high deficit policy of Hungarian incumbents (shown above) can be explained, to some extent, by its institutional and political systems, while one factor underlying the debt increase could be elections-related fiscal policies.
Testing for PFC in Hungary is conducted by analyzing the dynamics of the public (fiscal) deficit. We statistically test the hypothesis that the governments may engage in opportunistic behaviors following an expansionary fiscal policy by increasing the deficit to reduce unemployment and increase output before/ during elections.
There is a wider consideration of contractionary post-election effects in theoretical works regarding PBC, which has not been considered as frequently by empirical research and has only been supported occasionally by empirical evidence. Few studies find evidence of expected post-election effects on different fiscal variables (e.g., Ames, 1987; Persson & Tabellini, 2003; Streb et al., 2009) In a recent study, Streb et al. (2012) found that political budget (fiscal) cycles contribute to public debt buildup in OECD countries but not in Latin America.
The remainder of this paper continues with an explanation of the methodology in Section 2, where the data, variables and empirical approach are presented. Section 3 presents the empirical (econometrical) findings of this study, and Section 4 provides the conclusions of the study. The Appendix contains detailed information on each estimated econometrical model.
Empirical methods

Data and variables of interest
Consistent with the opportunistic PBC model, we expect that the government may follow an expansionary fiscal policy before/during elections and return to the long-term path or tighten fiscal policy after the elections as constrained by the necessity to sustain public finance and/or reduce inflation. In this regard, the variable of interest we analyze in this article is the fiscal balance of the government. We statistically test the hypothesis of fiscal deficit expansion before elections and normalization or contractions post elections.
We analyze the time series data on net lending (+)/ net borrowing (-) of the general government of Hungary, generally referred to as the overall fiscal balance, which is sourced from the EUROSTAT database. 3 We base our analysis on quarterly data, which, in addition to providing more robust statistical results due to a higher number of observations (compared to a yearly based analysis), most importantly allows inclusion of any inter-annual election effects. Empirical analysis based on annual data has been one serious drawback of many empirical studies analyzing several aspects of PBC, both in developed and developing countries. Streb et al. (2012) argue that temporal aggregation, which is inherent in annual data, is a strong underlying factor that accounts for the non-evidence of PBC in most of the existing empirical research on developed countries. Opposite-sign shifts in fiscal policy within less than a year of elections offset each other, and consequently, PBC is underestimated if annual data are used. Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004) are even more critical of the inter-annual frequency of the time series. In their monthly panel data study that investigated opportunistic PBC in a set of regions in Russia, they argue that even analyses based on quarterly data tend to underestimate the PBC. They find that with respect to Russia, only with monthly frequency data is it possible to correctly estimate the magnitude and timing of generally short-lived but sizable election-related cycles.
In addition to overcoming this potential deficiency of temporal aggregation that is inherent in annual data, we could analyze election effects on the fiscal policy through two different time perspectives by utilizing quarterly time series. First, we could adopt the common approach of analyzing possible opportunistic electoral effects on fiscal deficit during different quarterly cumulative time intervals around elections, ranging from one quarter to eight cumulative quarters (two years) before and after elections. Second, we could adopt another approach, which, to the best of our knowledge, has not been used in the existing empirical research on PFC. This second approach aims to analyze possible electorally driven shifts of fiscal policy (fiscal deficit) during different yearly time windows before and after elections. We do this by creating yearly political dummy variables (PDy) (to be explained in the next sub-section). On the one hand, this new approach avoids the potential problem of temporal aggregation, given that the specification of yearly time 
Econometrical approach
Following the standard approach in this area of research, we apply the intervention analysis based on Box and Tiao (1975) , which is known as the Box-Tiao approach. This approach has been applied in several Searching for Political Fiscal Cycles in Hungary designed to mimic the cyclical behavior of the variable of interest throughout a full incumbent electoral tenure. A simple formal representation of the variable of interest (z t ) that is subject to the intervention analysis is the following:
where µ denotes the mean level of the variable time series, the term I t denotes the intervention effect due to a specific event (parliamentary elections) and N t denotes the noise of the time series. The last term (N t ) is modeled using a suitable ARMA (p,q) model:
where E t denotes an independent error sequence. The simplest term, which corresponds to the t-test in a non-time series setting, is the intervention term/variable. In this case, the intervention variable takes the form of a pulse intervention, meaning an abrupt jump in the series followed by a gradual decline at the normal level of the series. The pulse intervention term can be formally expressed as:
The parameter 0 ω measures the change caused by the intervention and is estimated with the ARMA time series components. The estimation procedure provides an estimate of 0 ω and a confidence interval for the parameter. The intervention variable I t is expressed as a dummy variable indicating either a specific time prior/ after the election or an approximate shape of the cyclical behavior during the incumbency.
We establish four sets of different political dummy variables (I t ) to analyze the impact of the election on the fiscal deficit as well as the implied contribution on the accumulation of public debt.
Note: For convenience, we denote ( ) T t P by PD representing the political dummy variable.
The first set consists of sixteen cumulative pre-election and post-election political dummy variables defined as: 
These PDs, which are individually incorporated into the specified models, aim to separately capture the election impact toward fiscal deficit before or after the election, throughout the different cumulative periods of time preceding or succeeding the EQ as well as during the EQ. The second set consists of four yearly political dummy variables (PDy i ) defined as: 
These variables allow us to analyze the incumbent be- 
. Note: In this case, PDsym -1 indicates the election quarter (EQ).
Both PDs from each couplet are incorporated and estimated simultaneously in the statistical models. The main scope of these variables is to indicate the magnitude of the possible fiscal deficit expansion relative to the contraction in exactly the same time interval surrounding the election, which permits inferring any net effect of PFC on the accumulation of public debt.
The fourth set of political dummy variables we design contains twelve V-shaped variables. These are certain ordinal variables intended to mimic the possible shape of the political cycle, which may be a significant determinant in the evolution of the fiscal deficit during an incumbent's full electoral tenure. 4 The empirical technique with these variables was originally used by McCallun (1978) and later by Grier (1987; 1989; 2008) , Beck (1987) PDcycle 9 model the case in which the expansion of the fiscal deficit occurs before the election (or around the second half of incumbency) and has a greater magnitude and/or lasts longer than the contraction, which occurs after the election (or around the first half of incumbency). Therefore, if statistically significant, the expansion-biased V-shape variables could provide statistical evidence that, in addition to the existence of PBC, the fiscal consolidation that occurs after the election is not enough to fully offset the pre-electoral fiscal expansion, thus contributing to the further accumulation of public debt. While the last four variables, PDcycle 10 to PDcycle 12 , model the opposite case, an expansion of deficit, which is more than offset by a stronger contraction after the election, and implies an overall reductive effect on public debt stock. Figure  1 shows the specific designed form of each V-shaped dummy variable during an incumbent's full tenure (or during the time interval between two consecutive parliamentary elections). Note that some of the PD variables from different sets are identical, such as PDcum 4
and PDy 1 , PDcum e and PDsym -1 , as well as PDcum i and PDsym i for all (i).
Specification and estimation of the statistical models
In the first stage, we precisely followed the Box-Jenkins methodology (Box & Jenkins, 1970) , specifying the most appropriate ARMA model for the fiscal deficit denominated both in nominal terms and as a ratio of the GDP. 5 We investigated both time series on the presence of any seasonal pattern as well as on the stationarity. 6 In the event of a non-stationary time series, we transformed the data into a stationary times series by applying the appropriate transformation approach.
We employed an iterative process of identification, estimation and diagnostic checking of several ARMA models until we finally settled on the most plausible model -the one considered the "best" model for each was determined to be the ARMA with two autoregressive terms of lag two AR(2) and four AR(4) and two moving average terms of lags one MA(1) and two MA(2). The "best" model for DNETDEF_GDP was an ARMA with a moving average term of lag one MA (1) and an autoregressive term of lag four AR(4). 8
In the second stage, based on the Box-Tiao intervention analysis, we incorporated one defined political 
PDcycle 5 9 6 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 0 5 10 15 20 25 The statistical significance of the political dummy variables, tested using a t-test, reveals any possible impact of the elections on the fiscal deficit. 9 The obtained results are discussed in the following section.
Empirical Results
The The increase in both measures of the deficit before elections intensifies as election day approaches, as indicated by the increase in the magnitude of several consecutive PDcum -i (PDcum -5 <PDcum -4 <PDcum -3 <PDcum -2 <PDcum -1 ). The nominal level of fiscal deficit spikes by almost 80% one quarter before the election quarter (EQ) as indicated by PDcum -1, and almost 70% in the EQ (PDcum e ) compared to its natural longterm pattern modeled by the ARMA components.
The average nominal expansion of the deficit during other cumulative periods before the EQ ranged from approximately 18% to 40% more than its natural pattern, as indicated by estimated coefficients of PDcum -2 to PDcum -7 and was significant at less than 5%.
Fiscal deficit measured as a ratio of the nominal GDP increases by approximately 3.2 percentage points of the GDP one quarter before the EQ (PDcum -1 ), while it is approximately 1 to 1.8 percentage points of the GDP higher during different cumulative periods before the EQ (PDcum -2 toPDcum -7 ) , the vast majority of which are statistically significant at a 1% level of significance.
Empirical results indicate that this loosening fiscal behavior vanished immediately after elections. Furthermore, statistically significant fiscal consolidation occurs within a cumulative period of three quarters up to two years after the EQ. The coefficients of PDcum 1 and PDcum 2 are not significant for either measurement of deficit or for the PDcum 3 for the ratio of deficit to the GDP, implying a discontinuation of the expansionary fiscal policy immediately after an election. The PDcum 3 (PDcum 4 in the case of the deficit to the GDP ratio) to the PDcum 8 results are significantly negative at a less than 5% level of significance, indicating a reduction in the fiscal deficit from approximately 22% to 29% less than the long-term pattern in nominal terms and approximately 1 percentage point in terms of the GDP.
When we analyze the effects of elections in "yearly time windows" surrounding the event, we can infer that fiscal policy was opportunistically manipulated only during the first yearly time windows before or after elections, while there was no econometrically important alteration of the fiscal deficit in the second yearly time windows. The estimated parameters of PDy -1 were significantly positive and those of PDy 1 were significantly negative at the conventional level of significance for both measurements of the fiscal deficit, while the coefficients of PDy -2 and PDy 2 , although with the expected sign, were not statistically significant at conventional levels. When first considered, the nonsignificance of PDy -2 and PDy 2 may seem to contradict the implications derived, respectively, from statistically significant PDcum -5 to PDcum -7 and PDcum 5 to In addition to enhancing the implications given thus far, the analysis based on the other two sets of defined political dummies, PDsym and PDcycle, provides some inconclusive indications for another hypothetical characteristic of PFCs in Hungary, that of proactive public debt accumulation. Almost all couplets of PDsym used in the analyses indicate that the fiscal expansion occurring before elections is somewhat higher than that of the post-election fiscal consolidation for each symmetrical time interval. More specifically, the increase in the fiscal deficit during different cumulative periods of time before elections, as captured by the significantly positive coefficients of PDsym (-i) , is not fully offset by deficit contractions during the symmetrical periods of time after the elections, as captured by the significantly negative (or insignificant in some cases) coefficients of PDsym (i) . This was valid for both measurements of the fiscal deficit, except for Couplet (5) in the case of the deficit to the GDP ratio, which showed slightly stronger consolidation after elections than the respective preceding expansion and was significant at 10%. Based only on an intuitive calculation of the PFCs' net effects, the expansion during different time-intervals before the election ranged from approximately 3.6 to 28 percentage points higher than the respective contraction afterwards, in the case of the nominal deficit. 10 In the case of the deficit to GDP ratio, the incline toward preelectoral fiscal expansion ranged from approximately 0.07 to 0.37 percentage points of the GDP, except for the PDsym -5 and PDsym 5 , where the difference between the two favored post-election contractions by 0.08 percentage point of the GDP. Nevertheless, these results from the PDsym variables could only be considered indicative and were not statistically conclusive. Based on the results of the Walt test, we could not reject the null hypothesis that the sum of the estimated parameters for each Couplet (i) is equal to zero for both measurements of the GDP. 11 This means that the empirical evidence from this sample of observations that are subject to this particular analysis is not sufficient to assert with a conventional degree of statistical confidence that fis-cal expansions before elections are significantly higher than their respective time-symmetric contractions after elections. Therefore, by implication, we cannot conclude with statistical certainty that evident PFCs in Hungary also have an impact on the accumulation of public debt. However, the above-mentioned differences in the estimated coefficients are indicative of the hypothesized PFCs' effects on the accumulation of debt, a finding that is also supported by the results obtained when using PDcycle i dummy variables. Among all three sub-sets of these variables -the first sub-set with dummy variables models a symmetrical fiscal cycle along a full incumbency, the second models a stronger expansion versus contraction phase of the fiscal cycle and the third models a stronger contraction phaseonly the second type of PDcycle variables were statistically significant at conventional levels. With respect to the nominal deficit, PDcycle 5 was significant at the 1% level, PDcycle 6 and PDcycle 8 were significant at the 5% level, and PDcycle 7 was significant at the 10% level. While in the case of the deficit denominated as a percentage of the GDP, PDcycle 5 and PDcycle 6 were significant at the 1% level, the PDcycle 7 at the 10% level and the PDcycle 8 was not significant. Based on the AIC and BIC criteria, the best models for both measurements of fiscal deficit were those with PDcycle 5 variables, as they entailed the closest resemblance to true fiscal cycle among all PDcycle variables employed in the study. It should be noted that among all variables, as designed,
PDcycle 5 is the one that emphasizes the greatest tendency toward the expansion versus contraction phase of the assumed fiscal cycle, either in the magnitude or time span. Again, these results with PDcycle variables are only indicative and do not infer statistically significant conclusions with regards to the hypothesized PFC effects on public debt. Further empirical analysis is needed to reach such conclusions. In addition to the presence of a PFC in Hungary and consistent with the common knowledge in the field of political business cycles, we also found some evidence that such politically motivated fiscal cycles may contribute to the accumulation of public debt stock. The fiscal deficit increases prior to elections and is followed by contractions after elections, a phenomenon that leans toward the expansionary side. Nevertheless, we could not conclusively confirm with conventional statistical certainty that existing PFCs in Hungary are also an underlying factor causing the accumulation of public debt in Hungary. Further analysis, however, could reveal a statistically conclusive answer to this hypothesis.
Conclusions
These empirical findings support the hypothesis regarding the existence of politically motivated fiscal policy cycles in Hungary. We found indications, although not statistically significant, that PFCs may contribute to the accumulation of public debt. Therefore, the existence of a PFC can be inefficient for the economy of 2 Nordhaus (1975) test, ACF and PACF plots, Empirical results remained generally robust when other competing, "second-best" ARMA models were used. 10 Calculated as the sum of PDsym -i and PDsym i when both were statistically significant or just the magnitude of PDsym -i when it was significant at conventional levels. 11 ull hypothesis: Coefficient of PDsym (-i) MA(1) -0.483 0.000 -1.014 0.000 -1.023 0.000 -1.024 0.000 -1.016 0.000 -1.003 0.000 -0.659 0.000 -0.656 0.000 MA(2) 0.934 0.000 0.940 0.000 0.938 0.000 0.936 0.000 0.933 0.000 0.931 0.000 0.688 0.000 0.682 0.000 -1.154,AR(4)=-0.279,MA(1)=-0.218,MA(2 MA(1) -0.215 0.000 -0.623 0.000 -1.005 0.000 -1.004 0.000 -0.982 0.000 -0.701 0.000 -0.683 0.000 -0.897 0.000 MA(2) 0.936 0.000 0.692 0.000 0.931 0.000 0.926 0.000 0.919 0.000 0.627 0.000 0.671 0.000 0.900 0.000 MA(1) -0.805 0.000 -0.806 0.000 -0.809 0.000 -1.011 0.000 -1.015 0.000 -1.013 0.000 -0.972 0.000 MA(2) 0.940 0.000 0.937 0.000 0.920 0.000 0.929 0.000 0.928 0.000 0.932 0.000 0.922 0.000 
